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Measuring the Effectiveness of Honeypot Counter-Counterdeception
 
Neil C. Rowe
Cebrowski Institute, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School




Honeypots are computer systems that try to fool cyberattackers into thinking they are ordinary computer systems, when in fact they
are designed solely to collect data about attack methods and thereby enable better defense against attackers.  Honeypots are more
effective the more ordinary they appear, but so far designers have just used intuition in designing them.  So it is valuable to develop
metrics for measuring the effectiveness of honeypot deception.  We report on several software tools we have developed for assessing
the effectiveness of honeypots, particularly a metric-calculating tool that summarizes a file system by a vector of 72 numbers. 
Comparison of vectors between fake and real systems can guide design of the fake.  We show that this metric tool, applied to a detailed




Honeypots try to entice software attacks with the aim of collecting information about attack methods, by deliberately permitting
most attacks and logging everything that happens [23].  They are an increasingly important tool for information security for when
access controls (passwords and encryption keys) are circumvented due to the flaws in software; they are also important as one of the
few methods for detecting new kinds of attacks.  They can also be used offensively, as when an enemy computer contains
"disinformation" deliberately constructed to mislead, or when a malicious network site tries to steal information from users [17]. 
Honeypots can be specialized to provide traps for email or worms [16], and can be generalized to "honeytokens" or individual pieces
of disinformation [24], but we will focus here on their traditional form of a full computer system.
Honeypots are only effective if they can deceive attackers into thinking they are normal computer systems.  Most attackers do not
want their methods known because they know that will lead to quick development of defensive methods to thwart them.  So many
attackers (including automated ones) will leave a computer system if they suspect it is a honeypot.  For instance, many automated
attacks look for the VMWare virtual-machine package on a system they are attacking, as it is often associated with recording their
activities, and kill their processes if so.
An important purveyor of honeypot products is the Honeynet Project [9].  They provide a variety of free open-source tools for
building honeypots.  Currently their most comprehensive monitoring tool is Sebek, software that runs in a disguised background mode
on a computer and relays decoded command information to an external archive (thereby defeating the new breed of attack tools that
encrypt their message traffic to impede monitoring).  A recent paper [3] claims Sebek can be detected by several clues in main
memory.  If this is true, this is a serious problem since Sebek is otherwise well-disguised.  Generally, however, trying to detect
deceptive computer systems by checking small details is a poor strategy since it is often easy for deception designers themselves to
find and eliminate such clues; for instance, once the Honeynet Project people heard preliminary results of [3], they fixed some parts of
Sebek.  So it would seem that a more robust strategy for detection should examine broad properties of a computer system that are
harder to modify.
Fake digital information can easily look real because computers copy information effortlessly.  But internal inconsistencies can still
occur with digital information.  Honeypots are actually hard to make thoroughly convincing because they do not have normal users
and usage patterns.  They should not have normal users because distinguishing attacks is then more difficult, and normal users could
easily get hurt by the attacks allowed on these systems.  So honeypot files can easily look suspicious, not even considering what is in
main memory.  It would thus seem important to develop methods for creating realistic-looking files for honeypots, files that could at
least fool attackers looking at their directory listings.  But it will not work to just copy a real file system because an attacker who finds
identical copies of user files will quickly become suspicious.
We can distinguish three main problems in designing and using honeypots:
The deception problem: Design a honeypot to look like a normal computer system.
The counterdeception problem: Given a computer system, decide whether it is a honeypot or not.  This is useful for assessing if
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a honeypot will fool an attacker; it is also useful for testing whether the files of a captured enemy computer are disinformation.
The counter-counterdeception problem: Design a honeypot to be maximally effective at fooling attackers into thinking it is a
normal computer system.






Deception has many applications to law, government, psychology, and entertainment [6].  Deception and counterdeception are an
accepted part of warfare in particular, as a way to maximize leverage in a situation with a fixed amount of resources.  One can fool an
enemy into overestimating your resources to scare them away, or underestimating to enable a devastating counterattack.
Attacks on computer systems are a form of war.  For fun, or increasingly for profit, "hackers" are trying to subvert computers
attached to the Internet with a wide variety of ploys that exploit weaknesses in computer software, and new attack methods are being
continually discovered.   So attackers usually have the advantage in cyberspace, and deception would seem a justified tactic of defense.
Many researchers have proposed models of deception. [22] identifies six kinds: masking (making a feature of the real become
invisible), repackaging (making something appear falsely to be irrelevant), dazzling (inducing information overload), mimicking
(making something appear falsely to be relevant), inventing (creating a new reality), and decoying (luring the target away with an
apparently better reality).  Creating fake file systems is a form of mimicking with inventing. 
Our previous work [19] provided a theory of deception based on semantic case theory, and applied it to deception in information
systems.  Examining the 21 proposed defensive deceptions there, the best ones for honeypots are (1) deception in object, deceiving as
to the reality of the files and directories shown; (2) frequency, deceiving as to the activity rate at a site; (3) time-at, deceiving as to the
timestamps on files; (4) cause, deceiving as to why files are present; (5) purpose, deceiving as to what files are being used for; (6)
content, deceiving as to validity of data in files; (7) measure, deceiving as to file sizes; and (8) precondition, deceiving as to conditions




Two strategies for counterdeception are possible: seeking unconscious clues, and seeking inconsistencies.  (They are analogous to
the distinction in automated “intrusion detection systems” for defending computer systems [13] between signature-checking and
anomaly detection.)   Unconscious clues arise when speed is required of a deceiver, and they have trouble controlling all the channels
of communication they impart.  For instance, a liar may fidget or exhibit an awkward body posture [5].  Other unconscious clues are
verbal, such as the number of words used (liars tend to use shorter sentences) and generality (liars tend to be vague).  [14] tested and
assessed a range of such clues.  Other clues are in the presentation or appearance of a fake object, such as evenness of handwriting in
written documents [15] and the stylistic consistency of a painting either internally or with respect to similar paintings [11].
Many important unconscious clues are lacking in digital information, such as source, timing, and manner of presentation.  Also, a
honeypot's deceptions can be designed long in advance and are not subject to real-time human processing constraints.  Nonetheless,
some clues can occur in the real-time behavior of the honeypot, as in the temporary contents it leaves in main memory and its
unexpected delays in processing.
The other approach to counterdeception is the detection of inconsistencies.  It is difficult for a deceiver to keep track of a complex
deception, and inadvertent mistakes provide good clues [8, 10].  Many forms of inconsistencies are possible, and counterdeception for
intelligence analysis requires a flexible frame of mind [22].   [21] makes practical suggestions for detecting deception in general, and





Not much attention has been devoted to counter-counterdeception except in the military literature where concealment and
camouflage are emphasized as solutions.  Starting principles come from analysis of the counterdeception process: Try to eliminate
unconscious clues and inconsistencies.  The approach proposed here is to define consistency as compatibility with average statistics.
3. Creating fake file systems
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3.1 The NFDir prototype
 
Several projects have proposed deception as a defense method for computer systems [7, 2].  In our previous work [20] we reported
on a fake file system FDir, now developed into NFDir.  Accessed via a Web site, the user sees what appears to be a Microsoft MS-
DOS directory system, like that obtainable by "Command Prompt" on Windows machines (Figure 1).  It displays realistic filenames,
directory names, file sizes, and modification dates.
The user can click on directory names to see similar listings for subdirectories down to around ten levels deep.  The user can also
click on the file names.  HTML files provide captioned images on the screen, with images and captions taken from real image-caption
pairs on our school's Web site.  Clicking on some other files, however, gives a number of error messages, including several kinds of
authorization errors, errors in missing software, and errors in files being too large to load.  Some files, especially the ".cyc" ones,
appear to be encrypted, displaying sequences of random characters.  In addition, as one gets deeper in the file hierarchy, surprising
connections start to appear in the directory hierarchy.  Figure 2 shows an example of a U.S. Navy historical photograph from 1928 –
but in a briefing on job assignments for the naval officers, for which this photograph is not relevant.
This honeypot is developed for a different type of attacker than that of most honeypots, the spy attempting to collect intelligence. 
Thus it attempts to present occasional mild discrepancies to intrigue the user.  The authorization errors (actually randomly generated)
and seemingly encrypted files (actually just random strings of characters) are ways to make them think that secrets are being stored
here.  The other errors and the cryptic context-free nature of the image-caption pairs are designed to provide mild frustration and
encourage a spy to explore further.  Surprising connections are one the chief things that spies are looking for ("don't tell me what I
already know").
      How long will this directory information fool a spy?  Probably not for long if a spy inspects it closely, as it is generated by a
relatively simple program (500 lines of Java code) supplemented by a database of image pointers and captions found by crawling our
school’s Web pages [18].  But spies have more important things to do than carefully check directories.  Some of NFDir's effectiveness
comes from exploiting real file and directory names and their connections.  For comparison, an earlier version of the program (Figure
3) used a stochastic context-free grammar to generate pronounceable filenames alternating vowels with consa-
 
      PublicWorks   03/22/03                 22:07       <DIR>
      ResAdmin       01/05/91                 13:45       <DIR>
      Research          08/25/95                 09:02       <DIR>
      SEAprogram.htm 10/14/03            13:59       250
      Summer2002    02/00/93 05:02       <DIR>
      Tools.rzp         05/23/93                 09:24       2523
      WebCommittee 01/29/99               11:56       <DIR>
      aboutfac          03/17/01                 21:03       <DIR>
      academics.html 06/18/95               21:37       46
      advisory          01/02/90                 09:03       <DIR>
      airforce             09/09/92                 10:13       <DIR>
      announcement_april_01_2002_picture.html                                              08/00/00                 09:22       442
      announcement_april_02_2002_picture01.html
                                08/19/99                 13:02       18
      avsafety           03/05/00                 20:09       <DIR>
      branding.htm  09/09/01                 22:17       911
      campus.html    10/14/93                 12:43       59
      courses.html   05/29/01                 05:573     22
      cs                      11/09/02                 01:38       <DIR>
      ctiw                   01/12/97                 09:01       <DIR>
      da                      09/03/91                 16:06       <DIR>
      dataprod.html 09/17/99  06:11       53
      denardo           06/09/94                 17:10       <DIR>
      dis-java-vrml   01/12/01                 02:08       <DIR>
      discovery.html 06/17/92                01:46       5830
      dlrc_resources 07/16/03                20:15       <DIR>
      elvis_fam.html 01/00/02 23:09       63
      elvis_tutor.html 02/19/95              05:04       16
7/22/13 10:39 AMMeasuring the Effectiveness of Honeypot Counter-Counterdeception
Page 4 of 12http://faculty.nps.edu/ncrowe/honeypot_hcss05.htm
 
Figure 1: Example fake file directory (NFDir).
 
 
Figure 2: Example fake file-system Web page from directory /root/fsoa/99detailerbrief.
 
nants) which tend to be more common on real computer systems than unpronounceable ones.  While system files tend not to have
natural names, partly from the 8-letter limitations on filenames in older systems and partly from the tendency of programmers to over-
abbreviate, a whole directory of such names is suspicious.
 
      aonucseydi6.exe 12/18/03        12:054     26382
      apsh.rzp      03/19/01                 09:19       28685
      b6x               10/25/03                 20:20       <DIR>
      buoano.exe 01/30/03 12:48       2391
      difhitvet.rzp 04/14/90                05:22       2479
      eooagauymi.rzp 09/19/95         03:14       33096
      eopewxulotfoqec 11/08/91       13:07       <DIR>
      eucnce        l01/30/03                05:09       <DIR>
      fqy1n.exe    03/06/02                 04:33       28849
      k2lam           08/19/97                 11:07       <DIR>
      ledhet          04/02/02                 13:15       <DIR>
      limwei          09/16/96                 23:00       <DIR>
      lowstfe        10/23/96                 23:03       <DIR>
      nehua.exe   03/00/02                 10:03       409768
      posnuhlaw.exe 06/16/93           15:03       152252
      sodtr           03/21/92                 01:29       <DIR>
      venpueeee414.gcc 05/31/92    07:08       1369
      x6fub           10/19/03                 19:07       <DIR>
      y1ytr31.rzp 03/00/02 07:23       5429
 
Figure 3: Example earlier fake-directory information (RDir).
 
Can we capture our intuition that Figure 3 is more suspicious than Figure 1?  If a directory is fake, it must depart from reality to
some extent, but we want to minimize suspiciousness.  Suspiciousness analysis really requires an automated tool because good
attackers automate their analysis of our computer systems with their own tools.
 
3.2. Principles for building fake file systems
 
NFDir suggests a good general approach to building a honeypot file system: Use pieces of real file systems but add a certain degree
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of randomness to provide the variety and unexpectedness typical of a population of similar real systems.  So if we want to imitate an
office's word-processing computers, we should take pieces from those computers.  Randomness can be accomplished in several ways
while preserving the overall character of the source directories:
·         We can copy files (or at least their directory information) from real systems with a large but not certain probability.  We did this
for NFDir by copying from Web pages at our institution.
·         We can copy a few files to different places in the corresponding file system than those they originate in.  We did this in NFDir
with a probability of 10%.
·         We can change the directory tree occasionally to put whole subdirectories in different locations.  We did this in NFDir for 10% of
the subdirectories.
·         We can create fake directory information using a grammar for the words and numbers, using data from real directories.  We did
this for NFDir size and date information.
·         We can create completely fake files by random number generators (which suggests encryption).  We did this in NFDir for the
".cyc" and ".enc" files.
·         We can create completely fake files by combining pieces of real files.  NFDir extracted images and nearby text from Web pages
to create new HTML files.
·         We can avoid creating some indicated fake files by setting their access rights to make them inaccessible to all users.  We did this
in NFDir with 10% of the remaining types of files.
 
4. Counterdeception for file systems
 
Following section 2.2, good counterdeception needs to examine both inadvertent clues in small details (suspicious features) and
inconsistencies with respect to normal behavior (anomalies).  A good counter-counterdeception strategy should do both too, then




[3] is the only good example of the suspicious-feature approach to honeypot analysis with which we are familiar.  (Some "hacker"
sites claim similar capabilities but rarely do the clues they propose work with any degree of generality.)  Their results come from
careful analysis of a running installation of Sebek, probing to find clues to its concealed operation.  Such a manual approach requires
extensive knowledge of an operating system.  Many (but not all) attackers of computer systems either do not have the knowledge or
the time to use it.  Thus a manual counterdeception strategy may not often be possible.
Detection of suspicious features of honeypots can also be made harder for determined attackers by making the code of the operating
system and software less understandable.  This is known as "code obfuscation" [12], and a variety of simple techniques are effective
for it; it is also practiced by writers of viruses, worms, and other kinds of Trojan horses.  However, it is only necessary for a honeypot
to disguise a few key suspicious features of its operations, like the forwarding of monitoring data across the local-area network. 
Another good counter-counterdeception approach is an "experimental" one.  Install a particular kind of honeypot and characterize
statistically the attacks that are aborted against it; then remove some feature of the honeypot and see to what degree attacks change. 
The degree to which attacks increase indicates what proportion of attackers are noticing that feature and leaving because of it.  This
can be done for any number of features of a honeypot, even those that hurt its functionality, provided secure auditing is done.
 
4.2 First-order statistical metrics on file systems
 
Anomaly-based counterdeception can calculate statistics on a file system and its subdirectories, and compare these between a
suspect system and a typical real system; significant discrepancies suggest deception.  For this to be useful for counter-
counterdeception, statistics are needed for all easily observed features of a file system, like how typical the directories and the
directory tree appear.  Work in computer architecture such as [4] has computed some metrics relevant to performance analysis of
computer systems, but we need metrics related to the psychological perceptions of a user.
Part of this is the a priori likelihood of each individual file or directory listing, what we call "first-order" statistics.  For instance in
Figure 1, “Public Works”, “Research”, "Summer2002", and "Web Committee" are plausible names of directories for an academic
institution.  For this analysis, we should split words into subwords when we can; announcement_april_01_2002_picture.html is
plausible because each of its six words is common.  Acronyms like "cs" and "ctiw" are rare, but the class of short acronyms is common
as a whole in organizations.
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We can also assign likelihoods to other information about files.  In our fake directory system, the extensions “htm”, and “html" are
familiar, "rzp" looks similar to the common “zip”, and "cry" suggests “cryptographic”, a plausible adjective for a file.  We can assess
the likelihoods of the file sizes (the last items on each line of Figure 1) using the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of
their logarithms, which tends to be normally distributed.  As for dates and times, we can also compute a mean and standard deviation,
but it is also helpful to obtain the mean within the day, within the week, and within the year to see periodic patterns.  A vector average
of unit vectors is appropriate for periodic values like time in the day, where the direction of the vector corresponds to time modulo the
period.  We can also measure typicality of substructures in files, such as how often a document has an abstract or a graphical header.
Statistics on directories are less variable than statistics on files and thus more useful for assessing the reasonableness of a file
system.  For instance, we can calculate the mean, standard deviation, smallest, and largest file sizes in a directory, the number of
characters in a filename, or the date a file was last modified.  We can take a weighted average of different metrics to get a cumulative
metric with distribution closer to a normal distribution, and we can apply tests of significance to values obtained from this metric to
assess to what degree a file system is suspicious.
 
 4.3 Second-order statistical metrics
 
Other metrics for a file system concern the relationships between files and between files and directories, what we call "second-
order" statistics.  Standard deviations over a file directory of individual file metrics are a good example, since they are larger when
directories show more diversity.  Minimum, maximum, median, and other order statistics can be considered second-order as they
characterize the distribution of a directory.   Another example is the similarity in the names of files in a directory.  Other second-order
statistics can be computed between files in different directories, such as compatibility between cached files and their current
counterparts, but we ignored these since they require more work for an attacker to check.
 
5. Experiments with counterdeception metrics
 
As a testbed for these ideas, we developed a software tool in Java to compute metrics on file systems.  It can analyze around 1500
average directories per minute on a recent Pentium computer.  An advantage of Java is that the same program (class file) can analyze a
file system on any machine with the Java Run-Time Environment, including Windows, Linux, Unix, and Macintosh machines.
 
5.1 The metrics used
 
The tool calculates 36 basic metrics on each directory of a file system.  Statistics are aggregated for each directory with those of its
subdirectories.  The metrics were chosen to reflect features most obvious in a quick inspection of directories: the form and types of
filenames, the types of files, the sizes of files, the date distribution, and the shape of the directory tree.  They were:
0: Number of files in the directory
1: Depth of the directory in the file hierarchy
2-6: Fraction of system, document, audiovisual, Web, and program files in the directory
7: Fraction of files with names that are single English words
8-11: Mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum filename length in the directory
12-15: Mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of the natural logarithm of the file size of a file in the directory (file
sizes tend to be logarithmically distributed [25])
16-19: Mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum day of last modification of a file in the directory
20-23: Mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum time within the day of last modification of a file in the directory
24-27: Mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum number of pieces in the filename of a file in the directory
28: Mean similarity of the filename pieces to directory name pieces, excluding common words and eliminating suffixes, and
including front-letter and abbreviation matches weighted at half the importance (so directory "graduation_pictures_2005" matches
file "2005_grad_ceremony1" with a weight of 3, 2 points for "2005" and 1 point for "graduation")
29: Mean similarity of the filename pieces within the directory
30-31: Statistic 8 for just system and document files respectively
32-33: Statistic 12 for just system and document files respectively
34-35: Statistic 16 for just system and document files respectively
Our program calculates these basic metrics for each directory as well as their standard deviations (weighted by directory size) over
all directories, for a total of 72 vector components for each directory of each computer system.  Standard deviations over all directories
are important, as for instance a system with exactly 16 files in every directory is suspicious.  The standard deviation, minimum, and
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maximum statistics within a directory as well as statistics 20 and 21 are second-order statistics, and the rest are first-order statistics. 
Statistics were mapped to 32-bit integers to save space.
 Table 1 shows some example metrics for five systems at our institution: (1) a computer-science Unix file server at our school, (2)
an operations-research Unix file server, (3) an oceanography Unix file server, (4) our office desktop Windows machine, (5) and the
Linux machine of a colleague.  The differences in the statistics suggest important differences in the usage of the computers.  Indeed,
our metrics tool could be a good way to analyze usage patterns.
 
Table 1: Ten representative metrics on five file systems.
Metric Sys. 1 Sys. 2 Sys. 3 Sys. 4 Sys. 5
Total files 215814 50860 315678 81346 2,515,746
Av. dir. size 19.2 18.2 76.3 18.5 76.3
# doc. files
per directory
0.3 0.9 0.26 1.4 0.04
# Web files
per directory




2.5 5.5 1.5 1.4 4.3
Av. filename
length
8.9 9.0 10.8 10.5 6.4
Av. log of
file size
7.9 9.7 7.4 7.7 2.7
Av. day
modified
11041 11459 11035 11706 12341
Av. minute
in day




2.1 2.7 3.1 2.3 2.0
 
5.2 Comparing two file systems
 
We can then compare two file systems as a whole by comparing the metrics on corresponding directories, especially for the top-level
directories which include statistics on everything beneath them.  Comparing whether two metrics are significantly different is a classic
problem in statistics, for which it is reasonable to assume a normal distribution since we are summing 72 random variables and the
Central Limit Theorem should apply well.  We weight the metrics equally; a more sophisticated approach could learn weights from
training examples.  Then the standard error is the square root of the sum of the squares of the standard deviations of the metrics.  This
requires  and  for the mean and standard deviation of the metric k for system i.  To the difference in means of metrics we add a
factor for the difference in the standard deviations; we intuitively assessed this effect as being half that of the difference in means since
it requires viewing a set of directories to notice.  To estimate its degree of significance, we estimate the standard deviation of the
standard deviations for metric k, , by an unweighted estimate over the set of all known files systems (computing this more
accurately would require doubling the amount of data we collect for each directory and subdirectory).  So in total we compute to
compare system i and system j:
As an example, we compared metrics of two fake directory systems with those of ten representative machines in our building.  Table 2
shows the mean error  for each pair of systems.  Table 3 explains the systems referred to in Table 2; "# of files studied" is the
number encountered in the breadth-first search on the system up to the maximum number that our program could analyze, about
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500,000 files, due to Java storage limitations.
 
Table 2: Mean errors over 72 statistics in pairwise system comparisons.
 rpc npc lab canis earth uusr phy oc5 mtll custy rdir nfdir
rpc 0.000 0.432 0.559 0.773 0.576 0.801 0.673 0.709 0.901 0.895 1.298 0.985
npc 0.432 0.000 0.565 0.716 0.665 0.867 0.676 0.811 0.861 0.909 1.226 1.041
lab 0.559 0.565 0.000 0.967 0.529 0.645 0.702 0.684 0.760 0.617 1.373 1.047
canis 0.773 0.716 0.967 0.000 0.591 1.052 0.500 0.739 1.156 1.306 1.525 1.108
earth 0.576 0.665 0.529 0.591 0.000 0.641 0.471 0.520 0.728 0.736 1.237 0.970
uusr 0.801 0.867 0.645 1.052 0.641 0.000 0.761 0.924 0.855 0.735 1.784 1.363
phy 0.673 0.676 0.702 0.500 0.471 0.761 0.000 0.601 0.813 0.904 1.321 1.166
oc5 0.709 0.811 0.684 0.739 0.520 0.924 0.601 0.000 0.829 0.886 1.289 1.291
mtll 0.901 0.861 0.760 1.156 0.728 0.855 0.813 0.829 0.000 0.622 1.480 1.333
custy 0.895 0.909 0.617 1.306 0.736 0.735 0.904 0.886 0.622 0.000 2.438 1.640
rdir 1.298 1.226 1.373 1.525 1.237 1.784 1.321 1.289 1.480 2.438 0.000 1.648
nfdir 0.952 0.958 0.942 1.060 0.899 1.264 1.062 1.265 1.156 1.324 1.480 0.000
 
Table 3: Code names for the systems in Table 2 and information about them.
Code name Operating system # of files
studied
Description
rpc Windows 2000 80,084 Author's older office computer
npc Windows 2000 48,612 Author's newer office computer
lab Windows 2000 162,281 Machine in the student computer-science lab
canis Sun Unix 29,351 Author's old Unix  workstation
earth Sun Unix 309,054 Old Web server for the author's school
uusr Sun Unix 154,481 Applications software directory on a file server
phy Sun Unix 72,762 Physics department file server
oc5 Sun Unix 507,236 Oceanography department file server
mtll Linux 330,763 Colleague's new machine
custy Macintosh 330,783 Staff person's machine
rdir Fake 26,586 Simple fake directory system
nfdir Fake 4,495 More sophisticated fake directory system
 
It can be seen that NFDir is not perfect in imitating any of the ten real systems, but it is not far from them; the additional error
averages to around 0.3 of a standard deviation, something not very perceptible to a user.  The main weakness of our fakes was the
fractions of expected file types; NFDir simulated a Web server, and had a high proportion of HTML pages with low proportions of
audiovisual files (images were accomplished by external Web links), document, and system files.  It also had weaknesses in the
filenames since they came from real Web pages: There were too many English-word filenames and too many distinct parts of the
filenames.
Figures 4-9 show plots of the probability distribution of values for the fake file system NFDir versus the composite of the ten
normal systems, using the first 40,000 data points from the traversal of each so as to avoid bias towards large systems.  The dotted line
in each graph is the fake file system, and the solid line is the composite of the normal systems.  Note the log-linear trend for directory
size, Poisson-like distributions for Figure 5-7, and specialized (but interesting) distributions for dates and times.  NFDir has been
improved using this.
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Figure 4: Distributions of directory sizes.
 
Figure 5: Distributions of number of characters in the filename.
 
Figure 6: Distributions of the number of pieces in the filename.
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Figure 7: Distributions of the overlap between file and directory names.
Figure 8: Distributions of day of last modification of a file.
Figure 9: Distributions of time of day of last modification of a file (in minutes since midnight).
 
 
 Our tool also compares corresponding subdirectories, which is useful because matching importance varies considerably:
Similarities of software directories are more important than similarities of user directories.  Table 4 shows some examples.
 
 
Table 4: Example comparison of the same directory on different computers.






c:\Documents and Settings Directory size 18 6 0.17
c:\Documents and Settings File size in bytes 66 53 0.65
c:\Documents and Settings Date last modified 12235 11958 0.57
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c:\java Directory size 18 114 1.03
c:\java File size in bytes 80 115 1.89
c:\java Date last modified 11856 12380 2.69
c:\Program Files Directory size 17 11 0.15
c:\Program Files File size in bytes 79 78 0.04
c:\Program Files Date last modified 11302 11615 0.59
c:\forms Directory size 22 46 1.78
c:\forms File size in bytes 86 78 0.76
c:\forms Date last modified 11990 11906 1.02
 
6. Finding mappings between directories
 
Equivalent directories on different computers may have different names and paths (since, for instance, software can be installed in
many places).  So we wrote a tool to infer apparently equivalent but differently-named directories.  Examples we found were:
·                        c:/Program Files/Java/j2re1.4.1_01 maps to c:/j2sdk1.4.2_01/jre
·                        c:/Documents and Settings/msmith maps to c:/Documents and Settings/williams
·                        /work/ssiripal/java/demo/jfc/Java2D/src maps to c:/j2sdk1.4.2_01/demo/plugin/jfc/  Java2D/src/java2d
This tool searches for pairs of directories that (a) have more than a threshold number (we used 10 in experiments) of subdirectories
in common, and (b) differ by no more than a threshold (we used 20%) in the sum of the percentage deviations for the five types of
files.  Using it we found 379 such mappings between directories for 10,068 directories on four representative file systems, and these
mappings created 4636 additional aggregations of statistics for the directories.  We then applied these mappings and recalculated the
statistics on the merged directories.  No significant difference was observed with our test directories, but we expect this help with a




The Honeynet Project [9] suggests that honeypots are most effective when implemented in local-area networks ("honeynets") for
better understanding of the networking aspects of attacks.  An additional issue is then the convincingness of a network of honeypots. 
This means that not only are the honeypots convincing individually, but that their relationships are convincing.  For this we can
compare the  values as in Table 2; low values are suspicious, and the standard deviation over all comparisons provides the degree of
statistical significance.  This will detect honeynets created by too-exact copying.  For instance for Table 2, the mean standard error
between different real computer systems is 0.857 with a standard deviation of 0.280.  This means that NFDir was within one standard
deviation in mean error on seven of the ten systems, and within two standard deviations for the other three.  Thus it is a reasonably




Honeypot computer systems are important tools in protecting computer systems, and they must be deliberately deceptive to be
effective.  This raises interesting problems in how to construct effectively deceptive ones, the reverse of the usual concern of deception
theory in detecting deception.  We have developed several tools for evaluating honeypot deceptions, the most elaborate being a tool for
computing metrics on computer systems and comparing their values to those of a honeypot.  Experiments suggest that it is reasonably
effective at providing a counter-counterdeception capability.
An interesting open question is to what extent these techniques may induce an “arms race” with attackers continually finding ways
to detect improved honeypots.  But for the same reason that anti-virus software is not obsolete because of the viral “arms race”,
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